The question of whether Bersatu can be summarily expelled from Perikatan Nasional has become clearer following comments by a longtime associate of Muhyiddin Yassin. Marzuki Mohamad, who previously served as a senior aide to the PN chairman, has emphasized that the coalition's foundational documents contain explicit protections against unilateral action against member parties. His intervention into this debate carries weight given his intimate knowledge of PN's internal governance structures and the agreements underpinning the coalition's formation.
At the heart of Marzuki's assertion lies a crucial constitutional requirement within PN's bylaws. The coalition's governing framework stipulates that the presidential council—comprising representatives from member parties—must reach unanimous agreement before taking any disciplinary action against a constituent party or making decisions regarding that party's parliamentary representation. This consensus mechanism stands as a deliberate safeguard, reflecting agreements negotiated when PN was initially established. The unanimity requirement effectively grants each major party within the coalition a veto over actions that could fundamentally alter another member's standing or rights within the bloc.
This constitutional architecture has significant implications for contemporary Malaysian politics, where PN's role continues to evolve following the 2023 general election and subsequent political realignments. The unanimity provision means that no individual party leader, regardless of their seniority or influence, can unilaterally engineer the removal of another member party. Such a mechanism reflects democratic principles within coalition governance and acknowledges the principle that major decisions affecting the federation as a whole must command broad support rather than relying on narrow factional control.
Bersatu's position within PN carries particular strategic importance given its role in forming government coalitions at both federal and state levels. As the party that originated the PN coalition concept and counts Muhyiddin Yassin as its chairman, Bersatu holds considerable structural significance. Any attempt to expel Bersatu without following proper constitutional procedures would risk destabilizing PN's coherence and undermining the trust that allows disparate parties to function as a unified political force. The unanimity requirement thus protects not merely Bersatu's interests but the stability of the entire coalition framework.
Marzuki's clarification addresses what appears to be growing confusion about PN's internal rules, possibly stemming from tensions that have periodically surfaced among coalition partners. Political observers have noted occasional friction between different PN parties, particularly regarding seat allocations in state legislatures and the distribution of ministerial portfolios. Without clear public understanding of the constitutional constraints governing such decisions, there is scope for misunderstanding about what actions are actually permissible within PN's framework. Marzuki's intervention serves to restore clarity about the actual boundaries of decision-making authority.
The requirement for presidential council unanimity on disciplinary matters reflects lessons learned from earlier coalition experiences in Malaysian politics. Previous federal-level coalitions faced instability when one partner could dominate decision-making or when stronger parties could marginalize weaker members. The PN constitution appears deliberately designed to prevent such scenarios by requiring consensus on consequential matters. This approach acknowledges that coalition politics demands mutual respect for partner autonomy and genuine shared governance rather than hierarchical control by dominant parties.
For PN member parties, this constitutional structure provides reassurance that their participation in the coalition comes with genuine institutional protections. Umno, Pas, and other PN constituents can proceed with confidence that their core interests—including representation in government and influence over policy—cannot be arbitrarily stripped away through unilateral action. This protective mechanism becomes particularly important given the complex negotiations required to maintain multiparty coalitions in a system where parliamentary arithmetic can shift following by-elections, defections, or other political developments.
The implications for Malaysian readers extend beyond PN's internal mechanics. Coalition stability at the federal level directly affects governance continuity, policy implementation, and the functioning of democratic institutions. When coalition partners operate under clear constitutional rules that all parties understand and accept, governmental stability improves. Conversely, when uncertainty exists about internal coalition rules, political tensions can escalate, potentially disrupting parliamentary business and delaying legislative action on matters affecting ordinary citizens. The clarity Marzuki has provided therefore serves the broader national interest in predictable, functioning government.
Looking forward, this explanation of PN's constitutional safeguards may influence how member parties approach internal disputes and resource allocation. Knowing that expulsion requires unanimity should encourage coalition partners to resolve differences through negotiation and compromise rather than confrontation. The unanimity requirement thus functions not merely as a restrictive rule but as an incentive structure promoting constructive dialogue. When all parties understand that they possess effective veto power over major decisions affecting them, rational politics suggests investment in building consensus rather than pursuing zero-sum conflicts.
The broader Southeast Asian context also warrants consideration, as coalition politics characterize governance across the region. Countries from Thailand to Indonesia have grappled with coalition instability, and the mechanisms chosen to manage multiparty relationships significantly influence political outcomes. Malaysia's experience with PN offers lessons about constitutional design choices that can either facilitate or hinder coalition durability. The unanimity requirement for disciplinary action represents one model for protecting weaker coalition members and ensuring genuine power-sharing rather than dominant-party control.
Marzuki Mohamad's clarification thus addresses a practically important question with implications reaching well beyond PN's immediate internal affairs. By confirming that PN's constitution mandates unanimous presidential council approval for expulsion or seat decisions, he has reaffirmed fundamental principles of coalition governance that encourage stability, protect minority party interests, and promote decision-making through consensus-building. Whether current and future PN members honor these constitutional provisions will significantly influence both the coalition's durability and its capacity to deliver effective governance to Malaysian citizens.
