Singapore is moving to seal a significant gap in its anti-scam framework by criminalizing the provision and use of online accounts—a practice that has become central to modern fraud operations across the region. The newly introduced Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill, tabled in Parliament on Tuesday, August 4, targets account mules operating on Carousell, TikTok, Telegram, and Meta's platforms, addressing what authorities recognize as an evolving vulnerability in their enforcement toolkit.
The legislation represents a strategic escalation in Singapore's fight against fraud, which has reached epidemic proportions. Scams now account for three of every five police reports filed in the city-state, and cumulative losses have surpassed S$4 billion since 2019 alone. Last year, victims lost S$913.1 million to various fraud schemes, with government impersonation scams emerging as a particularly virulent variant—cases nearly doubled from 1,504 in 2024 to 3,363 in 2025, making it the fifth most common scam type. These statistics underscore why legislators believe they must act decisively to disrupt the supply chains that enable criminals to scale their operations rapidly.
While Singapore already maintains offences targeting money mules and those who supply SIM cards and Singpass accounts for fraudulent purposes, enforcement against online account mules has lacked legal teeth. The new Bill closes this critical loophole by making it an offence to supply, receive, possess, or provide personal information to create accounts on major platforms for criminal activity. This shift acknowledges that scammers now favour digital marketplaces and social media over traditional banking channels to establish their fraudulent infrastructure, and that legacy laws have not kept pace with this tactical evolution.
The penalties are severe. Those convicted of being online account mules face fines up to S$10,000, imprisonment for up to three years, and corporal punishment of up to 12 strokes of the cane. These sentences are deliberately punitive, reflecting authorities' determination to make account mule recruitment economically unviable and personally risky. For Malaysian observers, this approach mirrors recommendations being considered by regulators in Kuala Lumpur, who face similar pressures from organized fraud networks operating across borders and exploiting the region's interconnected digital economy.
The Bill also significantly strengthens Singapore's hand in compelling compliance from technology platforms themselves. The maximum fine for online service providers that fail to comply with codes of practice and implementation directives has been raised from S$1 million to S$10 million. Daily penalties for continuing offences jump from S$100,000 to S$300,000. These astronomical figures represent a substantive shift in regulatory power, reflecting frustration with platforms that have historically moved slowly to implement anti-fraud measures. Meta, which received implementation directives in September 2025 and January 2026, has reportedly seen reductions in impersonation scams on Facebook following compliance, validating the enforcement model and providing a template for other jurisdictions in Southeast Asia struggling with similar problems.
A particularly innovative feature of the legislation leverages artificial intelligence to scale enforcement operations. Police have observed that scammers deploy AI to create large volumes of fraudulent sites, accounts, and advertisements faster than manual review processes can identify and remove them. The Bill permits anti-scam directions to be issued through computer programmes, including AI-enabled systems, enabling authorities to match the adversary's speed and sophistication. Importantly, the legislation incorporates safeguards to ensure algorithmic accuracy and fairness, addressing concerns that automated enforcement could inadvertently harm legitimate users or create due process complications.
Beyond penalties and platform compliance, the Bill introduces three new orders that reshape how police can coordinate with service providers to disrupt fraud networks in real time. The first is a disclosure order compelling financial institutions, telecommunications companies, and online platforms to divulge information about specified accounts and scam-related activities. The second is an account disabling order allowing police to compel providers to suspend specific accounts for up to 30 days, with a possible extension of another 30 days. These mechanisms feed into Singapore's developing National Scams List, a real-time information-sharing system designed to enable banks and other stakeholders to intercept scam funds and suspend compromised accounts before money can be transferred, effectively freezing assets at the point of vulnerability.
The framework represents a fundamental shift toward preventive intervention rather than after-the-fact investigation. During budget deliberations in February, Minister of State for Home Affairs Goh Pei Ming outlined that shared information would encompass culprits' identities, bank accounts, phone lines, and online accounts. This holistic approach allows stakeholders to perform coordinated takedowns, stopping the flow of illicit funds across multiple channels simultaneously. For Malaysia and other Southeast Asian economies where cross-border fraud syndicates operate with impunity, this model of institutional coordination offers valuable lessons in how regulatory fragmentation can be overcome through standardized information protocols.
The legislation also institutionalizes restrictions on mule activity through a newly formalized service limitation order. Since October 2025, Singapore has operated a facility restriction framework placing 1,423 money mules, 1,439 SIM card mules, and 53 corporate mules under restrictions limiting access to financial, telecommunications, and Singpass services. The Bill transforms this largely voluntary arrangement into a legally enforceable regime, permitting police to impose service limitations lasting up to three years. This recognizes that recruitment of mules is self-perpetuating—individuals with restricted access cannot participate in new scam operations, reducing the active population available for criminal networks to exploit.
The severity of Singapore's legislative response reflects the extraordinary strain that organized fraud has placed on its criminal justice and financial systems. Scam syndicates have become increasingly sophisticated, employing AI, operating across multiple jurisdictions, and exploiting regulatory gaps that differ between countries. By tightening penalties for account mules, dramatically raising fines for uncooperative platforms, and enabling real-time account suspension through coordinated orders, Singapore is attempting to raise the cost of fraud while simultaneously accelerating the speed at which authorities can respond to emerging threats. The Bill's emphasis on technology-assisted enforcement and information sharing also positions Singapore as a potential leader in regional cooperation against transnational fraud, a concern that looms equally large in Malaysia and other neighbouring economies facing the same pressures from increasingly mobile and well-capitalized criminal enterprises.
